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GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION OF RATES UNDER THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT.
Among the numerous decisions which have been rendered by
the Supreme Court of the United States in regard to the regu-
lation of rates to be charged by public-service corporations,
probably those recently rendered in the cases of Arewl York v.
Consolidated Gas Company, A. Y. Law Journal, Jan. 15, 19o9;
and Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Company, N. Y. Laz Journal.
Jan. 28, i909; best evidence the care with which the Federal
Court proceeds and the positive facts which they demand, prior
to declaring the rates imposed by the legislature of the states as
confiscatory under the Fourteenth Amendment. The points in-
volved in both cases being very similar, it will only be necessary
to examine the facts and decision of the case against the Consoli-
dated Gas Company in New York, and apply them to the Knox-
ville Water Company case, in order fully to comprehend the
situation. The legislature of New York during the year of 19o5-
19o6, Chapt. 736 and 737, Laws of 1905, passed laws restraining
corporations furnishing or selling illuminating gas in the city of
New York from charging the city more than seventy-five cents,
and consumers other than the city, more than eighty cents per one
thousand cubic feet, also requiring them to have a specified illum-
inating power, a certain pressure at all distances from the place
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of manufacture, and prescribing a heavy penalty for their breach.
Soon after the statutes were passed the Consolidated Gas Com-
pany filed a bill to enjoin the enforcement of these acts on the
ground that they were unconstitutional, because the rates fixed
were so low as to be confiscatory, the penalties 'so oppressive as
to be unconstitutional, and the proviso regulating pressure im-
possible of fulfillment under commercially possible conditions and
therefore illegal. The preliminary injunction sought was
granted, and it was on the constitutionalty of the above
points, in an appeal from the Circuit Court to the Supreme
Court for the prevention of the issuance of a perpetual injunction,
that the Supreme Court held the .provisions in regard to pressure
and penalties as void on the alleged grounds; but that as the
Gas Company had failed to sustain the burden cast upon it of
showing, beyond a just or fair doubt, that the rates were con-
fiscatory, within the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States, the bill would be dismissed without
prejudice, for by actual operation tinder the statute, the company
may be prevented from obtaining a fair return upon the actual
value of the property at the time it is being used for the public,
and it should then have another opportunity of seeking redress.
Ever since the case of Munn z. Illino is, 94 U. S. 113, was
decided, it has not been disputed that the legislature of a state
has the power to subject the rates to be charged by public-service
corporations to govermental regulation. This can be (lone either
by direct statutory enactment, by delegated authority to a muni-
cipal corporation as a political subdivision of the state, Capital
City Gas Company v. City of Des Moines, 72 Fed. 818; or by a
commission created by the legislature for the purpose of regulat-
ing the rates in a manner which will conform to the peculiar cir-
cumstances existing in each county, city, or town, San Diego Land
& Township Co. v. Jaspar, 189 U. S. 439. This power, although
usually exercised by the enactment of a maximum rate to be
charged by the corporation, must be reasonably exercised in good
faith, and consistently with the scope and objects of the incor-
poration, consequently the rates cannot be imposed without
reference to whit is just and reasonable as between the public
and the corporation, for a state cannot by its agencies or under
the guise of regulation, bring about a destruction and confiscation
of property. Stanislans County v. San Joaquin Company, 192
U. S. 201. The rates should be regulated in such a way as to
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enable the company to maintain its existence, to preserve the
property invested from destruction, and to receive from the
capital actually and bona fide invested in the plant, a remunera-
tion or dividend corresponding in amount to the ruling of interest,
which is usually six per cent.
These rates, whether imposed by the legis.lature or the com-
mission, are all presumed to be prina facie reasonable, and are
the law of the land and must be submitted to both by the cor-
poration and the parties with whom it deals, until an appeal has
been made to the judiciary by a bill in chancery to have them
declared void for unreasonableness. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.
V. MimI., 134 U. S. 418, 456. Thus, the burden of proof is cast
upon the party alleging them not reasonable, and the judiciary
should not interfere with the rates established, unless they are
so plainly and palpably unreasonable, as to make their enforce-
ment equivalent to the taking of property without such compen-
sation as under all circumstances is both just to the owner -nd
to the public; or in other words, judicial interference should never
occur, unless the case presents clearly and beyond all doubt such
a flagrant attack upon the rights of property under the guise of
regulation, as to compel the court to say, that the rates prescribed
will necessarily have the effect to deny just compensation for
private property taken for public use. Unless the plaintiff can
show by a fair preponderance of proof that the rates so fixed
are not reasonable and in fact so unreasonable as to justify the
court in staying its operation, the decree must be for the
defendant. San Diego Land & Township Co. v. Jaspar, 189
U. S. 439.
The courts are not authorized to revise or change the rates
imposed by the legislature or the commission, or to determine
what under all circumstances would be a fair or reasonable rate,
but their power is merely to determine whether the rates so
established are unreasonable and confiscatory and when this has
been completed their jurisdiction ceases. At times it is very
difficult to determine whether or not rates are confiscatory for
there are so many factors, and the application of general prin-
ciples so strongly differ, as the peculiar circumstances and con-
ditions differ, that there is no special unfailing test or standard of
measurement. Capital City Gas Company v. Des Moines, 72 Fed.
829. The basis of all calculations, however, as to the reasonable-
ness of rates to be charged by a public-service corporation, such
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as a railroad, turnpike, gas, or water company, must be the actual
value of the property at the time it is being used for the public.
Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466, 547; San Diego Land Company
v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, 757. In ascertaining that value
the courts take many things into consideration. In the above-
mentioned companies, the value of the franchise, and the original
cost of construction as compared with the present cost, are usually
among the first considered. The original cost cannot be taken as
representing the actual value, as the company may have made
injudicious contracts, had poor engineering, or the materials may
have had an unreasonably high cost. Nor can the cost of repro-
duction always be a fair measure of the present value of a plant
which has been used for some years, as the constituent parts
depreciate in value from year to year in a varying degree. Then
the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount
and market value of its stocks and bonds, the probable earning
capacity of the property under the particular rates which have
been prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet the
operating expenses are taken into consideration and given such
weight as may be just and proper in each case. Srnyth v. Ames,
169 U. S. 466, 547; City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co.,
supra.
Should the courts, after considering the various elements, find
the rates confiscatory, they will be declared unconstitutional, for
if the company has been deprived of its right of charging a rea-
sonable rate for the use of its property in the absence of judicial
investigation, it is deprived of its lawful use, and thus in sub-
stance and effect of the property itself without due process of
law, and in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Con-
stitution of the United States, which declares that "no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law,"-and in so far as it is thus deprived, while others are
permitted to receive reasonable profits from their invested capital
-the company is deprived of equal protection of the law.
Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minn, 134 U. S. 418, 458; New
Memphis Gas Light Company v. City of Memphis, 72 Fed. 952.
In accord with these principles, the Supreme Court in Ragan v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U. S. 362, where the property
was worth more than its capitalization and the prescribed rates
would not pay one-half the interest on the bonded debt, and in
Covington Turnpike Companv v. Sandford, 164 U. S. 578; where
COMMENTS
the prescribed rates would not pay even the operating expenses,
has declared rates unconstitutional where they were clearly con-
fiscatory. But in cases such as New York v. Consolidated Gas
Company, supra; and Knoxville v. Kno-ville Water Company,
supra, where the evidence was not clear and convincing and
where the court had neither actual experience nor adequate
proof by which to judge of the confiscatory nature of the
rates, they are to be commended for the caution with which
they proceeded before declaring the rates illegal. In both equity
and justice the contested rates should be given an actual test
prior to the final consideration of the question of the issuance of
the permanent injunction, and the Supreme Court by refusing to
sanction federal intervention without clear proof of unreason-
ableness is establishing a precedent which should encourage such
a trial of the rate laws, prior to the attempt to have them declared
unconstitutional.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.. CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS DISMISSED ON"
ACCOUNT OF LAPSE OF TIME.
Is the dismissal of a criminal proceeding, obtained by the flight
of the defendant from the jurisdiction of the court and remain-
ing absent therefrom, for a sufficient period of time to enable him
to procure the dismissal of said proceeding solely on account of
lapse of time, such a termination of the action as will support a
suit for malicious prosecution? This new and interesting ques-
tion was decided in the negative by the New York Court of
Appeals in the case of Siegmund E. Halberstadt v. New York
Life Insurance Company, Vol. XL, New York Law Journal,
No. 86.
The action was brought to recover damages for an alleged
malicious prosecution for the crime of embezzlement, claimed to
have been instituted in Mexico by an agent of the defendant com-
pany against the plaintiff. A warrant for the arrest of the plain-
tiff was issued by the Criminal Court of the City of Mexico. but
it was never executed for the reason that plaintiff avoided arrest
by leaving the country and remaining away until a dismissal of
the proceeding was procured in accordance with the laws of
Mexico, on account of mere lapse of time.
No cases were found which are directly in point and the
argument of the plaintiff was founded chiefly on dicta. In the
case of Clark v. Cleveland, 6 Hill 344, the court said: "I bv no
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means accede to the doctrine inadvertently advanced by some
judges, that all right to prosecute for the offence must be ter-
minated by a technical acquittal. Nor can it be essentially neces-
sary that there should be an adjudication by the magistrate, or,
indeed, any judicial decision upon the merits, by any court, as
seems to be supposed by some." This doctrine is much broader
than the facts and circumstances of the case required. and as the
court decided against the plaintiff on the ground that there had
not been a sufficient termination of the prosecution to support an
action for malicious prosecution, the force of the rule is greatly
lessened.
The case of Coffey v. Myers, 84 Ind. 105, is also much relied
on by the plaintiff. The facts bear a striking resemblance to those
in the present case. in that the defendant in the criminal proceed-
ing avoided arrest by escaping from the state. But in that case,
the criminal charge was the result of a conspiracy to injure the
defendant, and was known to be false. The charge was bastardy
and the flight of the defendant was not due to his guilt but to
the fear of his inability to establish his innocence.
In Robbins v. Robbins, 133 Ind. 597, it was said: "It cannot
in reason make any difference how the criminal prosecution is
terminated, provided it is terminated, and at an end." Here also
we find that such a broad rule is not supported by the actual
decision. The plaintiff was arrested upon a police warrant and
after a hearing discharged upon her promise not to further
molest the defendant.
The other cases cited by the plaintiff are readily distinguish-
able from the case at bar, in that the prosecutions were termin-
ated, either by the entry of a nolle prosequi, or the abandonment
of the criminal charge.
To support an action for malicious prosecution the termination
of the proceeding must, in general, be a final acquittal. Bacon v.
Towne, 4 Cush. 217. This general proposition is held by a long
line of cases, but perhaps as good a statement of the law on the
subject as can be found is that laid down by the court in Lowe v.
Waterman, 47 N. J. Law 413. "A criminal prosecution may be
said to have been terminated where there is a verdict of not
guilty; where the grand jury ignore a bill; where a nolle prosequi
is entered, and where the accused has been discharged from bail
or imprisonment."
The court in its opinion discussed a number of cases which sub-
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stantiate the above doctrine, but no cases are cited in which the
dismissal of the proceedings was due to technical statutory rea-
sons, as in the case at bar. This very question arose in the case
of Sears v. Hathaway, 12 Cal. 277. The defendant had caused
the plaintiff to be arrested on the charge of concealing property
with intent to defraud and delay creditors. The statute provided
that in such cases the fraud must be evidenced by writing and in
the absence of such evidence the accused was acquitted. The
court in its decision said: "A party who stands before a jury
in such a case as this on pure technical law, for a defense against
an act of moral turpitude, and claiming a discharge because his
prosecutor has not pursued a statutory mode of proof to convict
him of a crime punishable by the statute, may congratulate him-
self that the precautions of the law have availed him to
escape its merited penalty; but he certainly ought not to
have in addition to this immunity, a right to claim a small
fortune from his victim for having mistaken the remedy,
or not having been as well versed as himself in technicalities
which sometimes shield guilt from public justice." Here we have
an action which was terminated by a jury's verdict of not guilty.
Still the court held that it was not such a termination as would
support a suit for malicious prosecution except perhaps to the
extent of the amount actually expended by the accused in defend-
ing the action.
Another question presented was whether or not the mere
issuance of a warrant on a criminal charge Constitutes such a
prosecution as will give rise to a right of action in the party
claimed to have been injured. The courts of the several states are
in conflict on this question. The New York court, in sustaining
this right, has adopted the rule which is probably supported by
the weight of authority and which as the court says should be
adopted "if for no other reason than to satisfy the principle of
law which demands an adequate remedy for every legal wrong."
However, the court was divided on this question, and Justice
Vann filed a strong dissenting opinion. All the justices con-
curred in the result.
WHfEN FEDERAL COURTS MAY ENJOIN STATE TRIBUNALS.
In sustaining the action of the Circuit Court, the Supreme
Court of th United States placed a new interpretation upon the
Act of Congress which protects state courts that have acquired
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jurisdiction from interference by ihe Federal judiciary. In Pren-
tiss v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 67, the court holds that this
immunity is not absolute and at all events, but that it applies only
to proceedings in which the state court is acting as a court,--in
other words, that it is the character of the proceedings and not
the character of the tribunal, that determines the immunity. The
statute in question, Rev. Stat., Sect. 720, is as follows: "The writ
of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United
States to stay proceedings in any courts of a state, except where
such injunction may be authorized by any proceedings in
bankruptcy."
This case arose from the fixing of passenger rates to be charged
by the various steam railroads within the state of Virginia.
The corporation commission gave notice by publication to all
parties interested to show cause why certain maximum rates
should not be adopted. The railroad companies appeared and a
hearing was had under all the rules of procedure governing a
judicial inquiry, and after the roads had announced that they had
no more testimony to offer, the commission took the whole matter
under consideration and after a delay of several months an-
nounced its findings in which it declared that certain named rates
would thereafter be in force, and further that these rates had
been found just, reasonable and not confiscatory. Before the
order could be published, the railroads went into the Circuit Court
of the United States and applied for an injunction on the ground
that the rates proposed to be enforced deprived them of property
without adequate compensation. An injunction pendente lite
being granted, the commission entered its special appearance in
which it objected to the jurisdiction of the court, demurred on
the ground that it was protected by the statute above mentioned,
and further entered a plea of res judicata, on the theory that these
rates had been judicially investigated by the commission, which
was a court of competent jurisdiction, and found just, reasonable
and not confiscatory. All of their defenses being overruled they
declined to answer further and the bills were taken pro confesso
and a perpetual injunction entered. The matter was then
appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States.
In sustaining the grant of the injunction, the Supreme Court
points out the distinctions that separate the various functions of
this Commission. In arriving at a proper understanding of the
powers of this Commission they adopt the interpretation placed
by the Supreme Court of Appeals of that state upon the sections
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of the Constitution of Virginia which created it. In Norfolk v.
Commonwealth, iO3 Va. 295, that court said: "In this common-
wealth the State Corporate Commission is the instrumentality
through which the state exercises its governmental powers for the
regulation and control of public service companies. For that
purpose it has been clothed with legislative, executive and judicial
powers."
It will be seen from this that the Commission has the powers of
the court, and in addition thereto, the powers usually delegated
to the other two branches of government. While this is unusual,
it has been held constitutional, and is not without precedent. The
separation of the three great departments of government is obli-
gatory upon the nation and not the individual states. Dreyer v.
Illinois, 187 U. S. 71. In Calder v. Bull, 3 Dallas 386, the
Supreme Court of the United States had before it a case in which
the legislature of Connecticut had granted a new trial in a private
litigation. It was claimed that this was an invasion of the powers
of the judiciary. This was not denied, and the court held that
this did not violate any provision of the Constitution of Connec-
ticut and that there was not any federal question involved. There
are numerous other instances in the reports where one department
of a state has exercised functions of another department.
Admitting that the commission is to some extent a court and
that the uniting of powers is constitutional, the next inquiry must
be as to the character of the proceedings brought into question.
It was the determination and publication of certain railroad
rates, and the making of rates is a legislative function. The
Supreme Court so held as far back as 1876, Munn v. Illinois, 94
U. S. 133; Chicago etc., Railway Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 153; and
these cases were reviewed and sustained in the famous case of
Smvthe v. Ames, 66 U. S. 466. This settles the question that
in prescribing what rates are to be in force, the state, through its
commission, was exercising its legislative and not its judicial
function.
But even admitting that rate-making is absolutely a legislative
function, the Commission contended that a full and complete
hearing had been held, in which the railroads had been fully
represented and heard, and that in finding that the proposed
schedule of rates was just, reasonable, and not confiscatory, the
Commission' had acted judicially, that there had been due process
of law, that the matter was therefore res judicata, and the pro-
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ceedings in question those of a court such as is protected by the
statuit under discussion, and in this contention they are sustained
by the Chief Justice with whom Justice Harlan concurred. The
majority of the court holds that in making the order enjoined, the
commission was exercising its legislative functi6ns, and before
the matter could become res judicata, and attain the dignity and
protection of a judicial inquiry, there must first be a valid law, a
failure to obey it, and then an inquiry as to whether or not the
law had been violated or was constitutional. They rest their
conclusion in part upon the decision of the courts of Virginia in
Winchester Railway Co. v. Commonwealth, io6 Va. 281, a por-
tion of that opinion being the following: "When in the exercise
of its legislative function it (the Commission) has in obedience
to the laws of the state summoned persons, natural or artificial,
before it, to protect their rights, it has done what is not required
to be done by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, and what it might have omitted to do, so far
as that instrument is concerned. But when it comes to enforce
its rules and regulations, this right to be summoned to answer
is not satisfied by the antecedent summons and appearance before
the commission. The Commission may exercise legislative and
judicial functions but cannot confuse and blend them in one
proceeding."
Pursuing further this line of reasoning the court holds that the
final act accomplished determines the nature of the entire pro-
ceeding, and in this case the final act was legislative. The previous
hearing, while termed by the Chief Justice as a judicial inquiry
preceding legislative action, is held by the majority of the court
to be only that investigation which to some extent should precede
all legislation. It holds that legislation and adjudication cannot
be part of one and the same proceeding, and further, that by no
process of reasoning can a judicial inquiry take place and litiga-
tion result before the law is put into effect. "A judicial inquiry
investigates, declares and enforces liabilities, as they stand on
present and past facts, under laws supposed already to exist.
Legislation on the other hand looks to the future, and changes
existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied there-
after. * * * * The establishment of a rate is the making
of a rule for the future, and therefore is an act legislative and
not judicial in kind. See Interstate Commerce Com. v. Cincinnati
etc., Railway, 167 U. S. 479 to 505.
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Furthermore, it has already been held, in a case involving the
North Carolina Railroad Commission, that proceedings legislative
in nature are not proceedings in a court within the meaning of
Rev. Stat. 720, no matter what may be the general or dominant
character of the body. Southern Rv. Co. v. Greensboro Ice &
Coal Co., 134 Fed. Rep. 82, affirmed, 202 U. S. 543. Had this
been a proceeding to enforce an order of the commission already
promulgated, it could not have been interfered with by injunction,
but "litigation cannot arise until the moment of legislation is
past." See Southern Railway Co. v. CoM., 107 Va. 771 6o
S. E. 70.
MENTAL ANGUISH AS DAMAGE IN DELAYED TELEGRAMS.
There have been many conflicts in decisions between the dif-
ferent state courts but it is doubtful whether there is any subject
upon which the cases are so positively opposed to each other as
that mentioned above.
The Supreme Court of Tennessee in Western Union Telegraph
Co. v. Potts, 113 S. W. 789, is the most recent case to hold that
mental anguish is an element of damage recoverable for delay
in delivering a telegram announcing a death. When Shearn and
Redfield published their work on the Law of Negligence, they
expressed the opinion that delay in the announcement of a death
may often be productive of an injury to feelings which cannot
easily be estimated in money, but for which a jury should be at
liberty to award fair damages. No authorities were cited to
support the proposition and it passed unnoticed until the case of
So Relle v. W. U. Telegraph Co.. 55 Tex. 308 (881). In this
case the court adopted the suggestion of Shearn and Redfield.
and for the first time in the history of the common law, damages
were awarded for mental suffering caused by the delay of a
telegram. The opinion said that the natural consequence of a
failure to transmit and deliver a so-called death message was to
produce the keenest sense of grief and inflict upon the mind the
sorest sorrow for which justice required the balm of damages.
Hitherto, no jurisdiction allowed a recovery for injury to feelings
except in a few isolated breach of promise suits, or in cases where
the injury was wilful and malicious. But this case has been the
precursor of a number of others holding the same way and may
be considered responsible for the great division of opinion now
existing. At the time the decision was rendered it is doubtful
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whether the court realized the great influence it would have upon
many similar cases subsequently arising not only in Texas, but
in other states. Other courts were not long in seizing upon the
doctrine expressed, and when once "',-y adopted it, except in the
case of Indiana, have tenaciously retained it. In Cowan v. The
Western Union Telegraph Co., 122 Ia. 379, it was strongly
urged that the case of Mentser v. Telegraph Co., 93 Ia. 752,
which followed the Texas decision, be overruled because the
authority mainly relied upon in the Mentzer case (Reese v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 123 Ind. 294) had since been
overruled by the Indiana courts, but the judges expressed them-
selves as well satisfied with the.princip-ts stated in that case, and
hence we find the law of Iowa -.- '.lii be the same. While the
doctrine is of comparatively recent origin it has steadily gained
strength, although many judges continually characterize it as
being contrary to the common law. But it possesses much in-
herent merit and after it was first announced rapidly obtained
favor with a number of the courts and in some instances with
legislatures. The legislature of South Carolina has provided by
statute for the recovery of such damages-23 Stat 748, Code
1902, Vol. I, Sect. 2223. This ac4 -,;as held to be constitutional
in Simmons v. Telegraph Co., 63 S. C. 425 Prior to its passage,
however, South Carolina had adhered to !-,: old common law
rule. Lewis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 57 S. C. 325. The
Louisiana Civil Code, Sect. 1934, says where the contract has for
its object the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment whether
in- religion, morality or taste, or some convenience or other legal
gratification, although these are not appreciated in money by the
parties, yet damages are due for their breach. In Graham v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., lO9 La. 1O7O, it is said that in
view of this it is difficult to see why a breach of contract which
leads to the infliction of positive mental suffering should remain
without a legal remedy. While all the courts agree that the legis-
lature may pass such an act, it is remarkable to note the number
of cases holding there can be no recovery at common law because
the damages are too speculative, and therefore impossible of com-
putation, and yet at the same time intimate that a legislative enact-
ment would afford relief. If it is impossible to determine
damages in the absence of a statute, it is questionable whether an
act which merely gives a right of action will remedy such a fault.
Until recently the tendency of the Alabama courts was to admit
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the rule in its entirety, but with the case of Western Union Tele-
graph Co. v. Blockcr, 138 Ala. 484 (1903), it was subjected to the
modification that damages will not be allowed for mental anguish
unless shown to be accompanied by other damage resulting from
the wrong. Nebraska and Nevada, however, have adopted the
rule as stated in So Relle v. Telegraph Co. (supra) ; Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Church, 90 N. W. 878; Barnes v. Rd., 76
Pac. 931.
Despite the number of courts permitting a recovery, upon
examining the cases it is apparent that the weight of authority is
opposed to this doctrine. But Mr. Sutherland in his treatise on
Damages (Vol. III, Sect. 98o), is of the opinion that the weight
of authority favors it. This work was published in 1893, and as
the law has undergone many changes since then, it is probable
that at the present time the author's opinion would be changed.
Some severe strictures have been passed upon the So Relle case
by those who incline toward the opposite view. In Chapman v.
Telegraph Co., 88 Ga. 763, it is said that the case adopts as law
a bare suggestion made by text writers, and that the cases re-
ferred to in the opinion were actions for physical injuries of
which mental anguish forms an inseparable component. A re-
mark to the same effect is also made in International Ocean Tel.
Co. v. Sanders, 32 Fla. 434. The justice of the doctrine seems
to be fully recognized by the courts holding the negative view,
but they are unwilling to part from the idea that there could be
no such recovery at common law and that while courts may
extend the application of common law rules to the new conditions
of advancing civilization, they may not create a new principle
unknown to the common law nor abrogate a known one. Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64, overruling Reese v.
Telegraph Co. 123 Ind. 294. New York follows the majority,
and holds that an injury to feelings is not in a judicial sense a
proximate consequence of the negligent act. Curtin v. Co., 42
N. Y. Supp. 1o9. Arkansas, Mississippi and Missouri all unite
in repudiating the Texas rule. See Peary v. Telegraph Co., 64
Ark. 538; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748;
Connell v. W. U. T. Co., 116 Mo. 34. The conflict is sharp and
well-defined, for there are no fine distinctions attempted to be
drawn in the opinions on either side. The arguments and prin-
ciples of law applicable are comparatively few and simple, but yet
there is almost an even balance of opinion upon each one. The
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fundamental objection is that it is impossible to estimate the
damages in this class of cases because the injury is of too vague
a character to have a pecuniary value. But on the other hand it
is claimed that it is as possible to estimate the damages as it is in
actions where the mental suffering is incidental to a bodily injury.
While there are many strong opinions to be advanced on both
sides of the question, it is doubtful whether the doctrine will ever
obtain a permanent foothold in the majority of states for there
are so many difficulties surrounding its practical application that
it will probably never have the support of the weight of authority.
It is worthy of notice, however, that those courts enforcing the
rule deny that there are any difficulties in the way of its successful
application. There are no English cases countenancing such law,
for in England the question has evidently been considered not
even debatable. It will be interesting to note whether in the future
other courts will .;ipport it, for it needs but very little authority
to shift the weight in its favor.
